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MOVING PAST HIPPIES AND HARASSMENT:
A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO SEX,
APPEARANCE, AND THE WORKPLACE
ERICA WILLIAMSON
Knowledge of history frees us to be contemporary.
–Lynn White, Jr.

1

INTRODUCTION
Darlene Jespersen tended bar at Harrah’s Reno casino for nearly
twenty years and received excellent reviews by both her managers
and her customers.2 Harrah’s terminated Jespersen in 2000 when she
refused to agree to the company’s new “Personal Best” program,
which among other things required all female but no male beverage
servers to wear makeup.3 Jespersen filed suit under Title VII.4 The
Ninth Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of Harrah’s,
rejecting Jespersen’s argument that the “‘Personal Best’ policy
discriminated against women by (1) subjecting them to terms and
conditions of employment to which men [were] not similarly
subjected, and (2) requiring that women conform to sex-based
stereotypes as a term and condition of employment.”5 The Jespersen
litigation continues to receive attention in the legal and nonlegal

Copyright © 2006 by Erica Williamson.
1. Lynn White, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Scholarship: History, 32 J. HIGHER EDUC.
357, 361 (1961).
2. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and
reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
3. Id. at 1078.
4. Id.
5. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108 (internal quotation omitted).
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6
7
press and to generate renewed interest among legal scholars and
8
practitioners on the issue of sex and appearance in the workplace.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
in the workplace on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national
9
origin. Many courts initially excluded grooming and appearance
10
standards from Title VII protection. Some later courts included such
standards but subjected them to a different analysis than other forms

6. See Carol Kleiman, Judges Embrace Mandatory Makeup, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 2005, at
C2 (“[R]ecently, female employees suffered a grooming rules setback in the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in Reno, when a three-judge panel ruled that women can be required to wear
makeup.”); Nation in Brief, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2006, at A2 (“A casino company’s
requirement for female bartenders to wear makeup does not amount to sexual discrimination, a
federal appeals court ruled.”); Henry Weinstein, The Nation; Court Rules Bartender Was Justly
Fired for Refusing to Wear Make-up; An Appeals Panel Decides the Grooming Policy of
Harrah’s Casino Asking Servers To Be ‘Appealing to the Eye’ Is Not Gender Bias, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 2004, at A18 (“Harrah’s casino in Reno had the right to fire a female bartender because
she refused to wear makeup despite the fact that she had consistently high employment
evaluations, a sharply divided panel of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Tuesday.”).
7. See Devon Carbado et al., The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at Work, in
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105 (Joel W. Friedman ed., 2006) (noting that in light
of Jespersen, “[this] narrative illustrates how employers have used makeup as a technology to
screen women into and out of the workplace”); Devon B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos,
Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 259 (2004) (“There is no good reason that bartenders
who are women should have to present themselves as girly.”); Serafina Raskin, Sex-Based
Discrimination in the American Workforce: Title VII and the Prohibition Against Gender
Stereotyping, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 247, 254–62 (2006) (“By continuing to be deferential
to company policies mandating sexual discrimination, courts undermine Title VII’s prohibitions
on sex based discrimination.” (footnote omitted)); Megan Kelly, Note, Making-Up Conditions
of Employment: The Unequal Burdens Test as a Flawed Mode of Analysis in Jespersen v.
Harrah’s Operating Co., 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 45, 66–67 (2006) (“The Ninth Circuit’s
unequal burdens test does not advance the goals of Title VII; instead, it permits discrimination
through policies based on sex stereotyping.”); Recent Case, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2429, 2429
(2005) (“[R]ecently, in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
undermined federal antidiscrimination principles by holding that female employees can
sometimes be required to wear makeup as a condition of employment.” (footnote omitted)).
8. See Michael W. Fox, Piercings, Makeup, and Appearance: The Changing Face of
Discrimination Law, 69 TEX. B.J. 564, 567–68 (2006) (“Somewhat surprisingly, the panel
decision was affirmed (again over dissent) when the case was heard en banc.”); Patrick H. Hicks
et al., Special Feature: Ninth Circuit Upholds Makeup Requirement, 14 NEV. LAW., June 2006, at
28, 28–29 (2006) (authored by the attorneys representing Harrah’s in the Jespersen litigation and
noting, “The seven-four majority opinion affirmed the right of employers in the Ninth Circuit to
enforce reasonable dress and grooming standards in the workplace”).
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
10. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975)
(“[H]air length is not constitutionally or statutorily protected, and hence its regulation as to men
but not women . . . is not sexual discrimination.”).
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11
of sexual discrimination. Recent courts have struggled with the
interaction between grooming and appearance standards and the use
of sexual stereotypes as evidence of sex discrimination.12 The
Supreme Court has yet to explicitly address sexually disparate
13
grooming codes, and circuit courts of appeal and federal district
courts must rely on forty years of unclear precedents that take a
number of different approaches to the issue. As a result, decisions are
inconsistent and modern employers and employees are uncertain of
their rights and responsibilities.
In response to the confusion, scholars have begun to suggest
frameworks for resolving sex and appearance disputes in the
workplace that do not rely on Title VII or notions of discrimination at
all.14 Despite the novel work being done by these scholars, courts
continue to decide cases addressing sex and appearance in the
15
workplace using a Title VII framework. In order for the Title VII
framework to be successful, courts must adopt a consistent,
doctrinally clear approach to its use. This approach cannot be
developed until courts and scholars understand the cases with which
they are currently working.

11. For instance, the mutability and fundamental rights distinction, see infra Part I.B, and
the equal burdens test, see infra Part I.C, are not often used outside the grooming context.
12. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1111–13 (en banc) (discussing
the use of sexual stereotyping as evidence of sex discrimination).
13. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989), appearance and dress were
among the factors leading the defendant to deny the plaintiff a partnership at the firm; however,
the Court has never heard a case in which the plaintiff specifically alleges that a grooming policy
is discriminatory. Further, at least one court has stated that the holding in Price Waterhouse
does not imply that sex-based grooming standards violate Title VII. Nichols v. Azteca Rest.
Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).
14. Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining
Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111 (2006); Gowri
Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry,
Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2006), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=872324.
15. See, e.g., Wiseley v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., 94 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 402, 403–10
(D.N.J. 2004) (summarily dismissing a male room service waiter’s claim that his employer’s
short hair policy violated Title VII on the basis of the equity approach—a claim that the policy
was not “evenhanded,” creating “no similar requirements for women” (citation omitted));
Barrett v. Am. Med. Response, N.W., Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1162–67 (D. Or. 2001)
(summarily dismissing a male ambulatory services worker’s allegation that his employer’s “no
beard” requirement violated Title VII on the basis of the equity approach); Kleinsorge v.
Eyeland Corp., 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1601, 1601–02 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (summarily
dismissing a male optometrist’s claim that his employer’s “no earring” requirement for male
employees violated Title VII on the basis of the equity approach).

07__WILLIAMSON.DOC

684

12/19/2006 5:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:681

The current Title VII sexual discrimination literature addresses
employee appearance cases in two ways. One group of scholars
chooses not to address grooming and appearance as a distinct
problem. They instead discuss employee appearance cases as
16
17
18
examples of trait, sex-plus, or more general discrimination. This
method obscures the unique issues that arise from the relationship
19
between grooming, appearance, and sexual identity. The other
group of scholars addresses the grooming cases thematically or en
masse without emphasizing their chronology.20 Addressing the cases
in this way runs the risk of focusing too heavily on the predominance
of employer friendly outcomes at the expense of examining in detail
the different analyses that produced these outcomes.
Unlike prior scholarship, this Note seeks to understand sexbased grooming challenges under Title VII21 by examining them in

16. Trait discrimination refers to an employer’s unwillingness to hire an individual because
he or she possesses a physical or character trait like having a tattoo or being aggressive.
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against
Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 170 (2004).
17. Sex-plus discrimination is “the classification of employees on the basis of sex plus one
other ostensibly neutral characteristic.” Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1089 (5th Cir. 1975). For example, an employer who refuses to hire overweight women but who
hires overweight men is discriminating on the basis of sex plus weight.
18. See Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination
Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769 (1987) (discussing grooming cases interchangeably
with other forms of discrimination based on mutability); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the grooming cases in the context of
discrimination and gender nonconformity); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing the grooming cases in
relation to ordinances that prohibit discrimination on the basis of personal appearance);
Yuracko, supra note 16 (discussing the grooming cases as a type of trait discrimination);
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex
Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004) (discussing grooming in the context of explaining
the bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”)).
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994)
(discussing the grooming cases without focusing heavily on their history or chronology); Karl E.
Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395 (1992)
(same); Mary Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 73 (1982) (same). Peter Zieglar does discuss the grooming cases with regard to
history, chronology, and distinctiveness, but he only had access to the first few cases. Peter F.
Zieglar, Note, Employer Dress and Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 965 (1973).
21. This Note defines a grooming challenge under Title VII as a case brought in federal
court challenging a particular grooming practice which results in a written decision. This Note
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their chronological context, distinct from other areas of sexual
discrimination jurisprudence. Such a chronological examination
reveals four discrete approaches to grooming and appearance within
the existing precedent. This Note explains the reasoning that
underlies each approach and how the approaches evolved historically.
Further, it identifies three conflicting goals for Title VII present
within the four existing approaches and reveals that each approach
emphasizes different interests. Each approach has strengths and
weaknesses, and courts have not successfully and consistently applied
any one approach. This Note contends that the current practice of
intermingling precedent across time periods, goals, and emphases is
unworkable.
Any future approach to grooming and appearance under Title
VII must have one clearly articulated goal and a mechanism for
identifying, quantifying, and balancing the interests of both
employees and employers. This Note seeks to use the lessons of past
approaches to determine what that goal and mechanism should be.
Further, it identifies two lines of cases, the haircut cases and the
sexual minority cases, that are often misused in the area of grooming
and appearance and seeks to clarify their appropriate roles. Unlike
the works of several current scholars,22 this Note does not claim to
craft a comprehensive new framework for evaluating sex-based
grooming claims. Instead, it seeks to provide an additional analytic
tool in the development of such an approach.
I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SEX AND GROOMING
LITIGATION
This Note examines over thirty-five federal district and appellate
court cases between 1971 and 2006 in which an employee alleged an
adverse employment action under Title VII on the basis of a sexdifferentiated grooming policy. Courts seem to have adopted four
primary approaches to address these types of claims: the per se
approach (PSA), the employer friendly approach (EFA), the equity
approach (EQA), and the Price Waterhouse stereotyping approach
(PWSA).

does not address state law claims or claims that may have been resolved prior to reaching a
federal court.
22. See supra note 14.
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A. The Reasoning and Evolution of the Per Se Approach
Under the per se approach, sex-differentiated grooming policies
are per se, or intrinsically, discriminatory and an employer must
justify every one as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).23
The PSA developed in the early 1970s from the opinions of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), before any sexdifferentiated grooming claims reached federal courts.24 Three district
courts later adopted the PSA to strike down employer regulations
25
prohibiting men but not women from having long hair. These
opinions and cases are rarely cited in contemporary grooming
litigation, but they have not been overruled and their analyses remain
relevant. The PSA establishes a logical link between Title VII and
grooming and appearance claims, giving plaintiffs a way to bring such
claims under Title VII. Advocates of the PSA argue that grooming
and appearance policies should be covered by the general prohibition
of “sex discrimination” under Title VII and that employers should be
allowed little latitude to use sex in such policies.
Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
26
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .

PSA advocates point to documents within Title VII’s legislative
history that support a definition of “discrimination” as “a distinction”
27
or “a difference in treatment.” The EEOC and courts applying the

23. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
24. Addressing its first grooming challenge under Title VII, the EEOC held in 1970 that
allowing men to wear casual attire while prohibiting women from wearing pants violated Title
VII and constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. Zieglar, supra note 20, at 967 n.12.
25. See Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (dismissing
the claims of four long-haired, part-time male college workers, holding that the employer’s hair
length policy was a violation of Title VII but that hair length had not been the cause of their
dismissals); Donahue v. Shoe Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (addressing the hair
length claim of a male shoe salesman); Robert v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio
1971) (granting relief to a male employee on a cereal processing line who was discharged
because his hair no longer fit under a hat, the required headgear for men, and he was not
allowed to wear a hairnet like his female coworkers).
26. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (emphases added).
27. Aros, 348 F. Supp. at 664–65 (referencing Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII of
H.R. 7152, 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964)).
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PSA reason that grooming standards are terms and conditions of
28
employment under Title VII and that any distinction or difference in
the way men and women are treated in the workplace is
29
discrimination because of sex. They interpret “because of sex” to
include distinctions based on characteristics that defy sexual
stereotypes.30
Grooming policies do not distinguish between all women and all
men; they distinguish between women with a given characteristic and
men with a given characteristic.31 This is commonly known as sex-plus
discrimination.32 PSA advocates rely on two cases that prohibit sexplus discrimination.33 Each case holds that discrimination on the basis
of sex plus any characteristic based on a sexual stereotype is
34
discrimination because of sex. The notion that only women should
have long hair may be considered such a stereotype.35 The employers
in the three district court cases adopting the PSA did not discriminate
against their male employees simply because they were men or
because they had long hair; they discriminated against them because
they were men with long hair.

28. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 952, 954 (1971)
(“We conclude that Respondent’s hair-length and other personal appearance standards are
terms and conditions of employment within the meaning of Section 703(a) and that the
Commission does have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the charge.”); see also Aros, 348 F.
Supp. at 664 (agreeing with the EEOC).
29. See EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 954 (addressing the
claim of a male employee who was denied employment for having shoulder length hair and
stating that “the application of a hiring/retention standard to [one sex and not the other], is
discrimination because of sex within the meaning of Title VII”).
30. See Aros, 348 F. Supp. at 665 (referring to the sex-plus language of Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) and Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
(1971)).
31. For example, an employer may hire women and men but refuse to hire women who
wear pants while agreeing to hire men who do so.
32. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (defining sex-plus discrimination).
33. Aros, 348 F. Supp. at 665.
34. See Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1197–98 (holding that an employer cannot refuse employment
opportunities to women but not men who are married based on the stereotype that married
women often forgo work to take care of the home); Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (holding that an
employer cannot refuse employment opportunities to women but not men with small children
based on the stereotype that women are the primary care givers).
35. Aros, 348 F. Supp. at 665 (“Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” (quoting Sprogis, 444
F.2d at 1198)); Roberts v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (N.D. Ohio 1971)
(analogizing the protective law cases and articulating a distinction between rules made on “an
individual basis” and rules made on “a generic stereotype basis”).
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Under the PSA, employers must justify all sex- or sex-plus-based
36
distinctions. PSA advocates believe that an employee’s desire and
right to be free from discrimination outweigh an employer’s desire to
run its business any way it chooses, and sex- or sex-plus-based
distinctions may only be imposed when absolutely necessary. Title
VII states, “[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to hire and employ employees . . . , on the basis of . . .
sex . . . in those certain instances where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .”37 A BFOQ is
a qualification that an employee must have to do a particular job. For
instance, an employer would be able to legally require that all
applicants for the position of wet nurse be women because men
cannot dispense breast milk.38 Customer preference is not a BFOQ.39
Therefore, under the PSA, employers are not allowed to require men
40
to wear short hair simply because customers prefer it. Employers
would, however, be able to require all long-haired employees working
with food to keep their hair in a net.41 Because the PSA requires every
distinction to be justified, doctrinally litigation under the PSA should
turn on which grooming and appearance codes are absolutely

36. See EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 952, 954 (1971)
(holding that applying hiring or retention standards to one sex and not the other, without a
showing of business necessity, is sex discrimination under Title VII).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
38. For a discussion of how the BFOQ has worked in other areas of sex discrimination, see
generally Yuracko, supra note 18.
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii), (a)(2) (2006). But see Yuracko, supra note 18, at 149
(distinguishing two areas in which sexual discrimination on the basis of customer preference has
been allowed: privacy and sexual titillation).
40. However, Roberts seemed to imply that “dress and appearance regulations might be
reasonable [BFOQs] in the context of public contact employees,” Zieglar, supra note 20, at 975,
but because the Roberts court was not working within the traditional Title VII BFOQ
framework the court’s opinions on the subject are of little value. The Roberts court relied on
Eastern Greyhound Lines Division of Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. New York State Division of
Human Rights, 265 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1970), which relies on an unrelated New York Human
Rights Law, id. at 746–47, rather than available EEOC decisions and Title VII precedent. The
court seems to be unsure of how to approach a Title VII claim. Analysis is further complicated
because the claim is filed as a § 702 claim based on “classifying” rather than the more common §
703 claim based on “terms and conditions of employment.” Roberts, 337 F. Supp. at 1057.
41. See Roberts, 337 F. Supp. at 1055 (allowing an employer to require headwear to protect
against unsanitary hair in the production process but not allowing the employer to require men
and women to wear different headwear).
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42
necessary. In practice this has not been the case. Courts have
struggled with how to apply the BFOQ concept to grooming
standards.
Those applying the PSA espouse broad definitions of sex and
sex-plus discrimination that provide extensive protection to
employees and use Title VII to eliminate virtually all sex-based
distinctions in grooming and appearance. PSA advocates rely on the
concept of BFOQ to protect the interests of employers, but courts
applying the approach give no indication of what type of grooming
and appearance policies might be worthy of protection.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the PSA has gained little
judicial traction. Even the Fifth Circuit, which originally articulated
the approach in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,
ultimately reversed its holding en banc and adopted the more popular
Employer Friendly Approach.43 No court since 1972 has utilized
precedent adopting the PSA.

B. The Reasoning and Evolution of the Employer Friendly Approach
Under the employer friendly approach, sex-differentiated
grooming regulations are not prohibited by Title VII because they do
not discriminate on the basis of immutable characteristics or
fundamental rights and therefore have a negligible impact on equal
employment opportunities. The EFA developed subsequent to the
PSA in the mid-1970s from claims primarily about male hair length.44
The en banc decision in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph
45
Publishing Co. is the most frequently cited case adopting the EFA.

42. In Donahue v. Shoe Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972), the court never properly
addressed the issue of whether short hair was a BFOQ for constant contact with the public
because the defendant failed to plead the issue, but the court implied that hair length was not a
BFOQ noting that “the EEOC has defined the exception very narrowly, excluding from it ‘the
preferences of . . . clients or customers.’” Id. at 1359 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii),
(a)(2)). The Aros court was no better at addressing BFOQs in detail but was careful not to
prohibit employee dress and grooming codes in their entirety and to acknowledge the necessity
and prudence of such codes for the health of the employees and for the employer’s “efficient
operation of the enterprise.” Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 666 (C.D.
Cal. 1972).
43. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc),
rev’g 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973).
44. Four federal courts of appeals cases taken together outline the EFA. Id.; Baker v. Cal.
Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45. Willingham, 507 F.2d 1084.
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In Willingham, a young white male with shoulder length hair applied
for a position with a Macon, Georgia newspaper that would require
46
him to interact with the public. Although he had prior experience
47
and passed all the applicable tests, the newspaper did not hire him.
A recent pop festival near Macon had left many of the city’s citizens
with a negative impression of long-haired youth, and the newspaper
48
feared that Willingham would have a depressing effect on ad sales.
49
The Fifth Circuit ultimately agreed with the paper. Decisions
adopting the EFA, like Willingham, reason that grooming and
appearance should not be covered by Title VII’s prohibition against
sex discrimination. Further, these decisions explain why the ability to
pass sex-differentiated grooming codes is important to employers and
why employees may not have a legally protected right to dress in any
manner they choose in the workplace.
According to EFA advocates, Congress passed Title VII to
ensure equal employment opportunity for men and women and did
not intend that every sex-based distinction in the workplace be
removed in order to do so. Title VII was not intended to address
grooming because sex-based grooming distinctions do not create
employment advantages for one sex over another. Further, EFA
advocates contend that courts should not defer to any interpretation
of Title VII by the EEOC that is contrary to congressional intent.
Courts adopting the EFA have analyzed the legislative history of
Title VII surrounding the addition of sex as a protected category and
50
51
found it “meager” and “inconclusive at best.” Therefore, these
courts rely on Title VII’s plain language and existing Title VII
52
precedent to conclude that Congress’s primary goal was “that
women . . . be afforded job opportunities on an equal footing with
53
54
men.” Under this interpretation the “emphasis rightly lies” on
equal employment opportunity, not on the elimination of all
distinctions as the PSA advocates. “[O]nly those classifications or
46. Id. at 1087.
47. Willingham, 482 F.2d at 536.
48. Id. at 536–37.
49. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092.
50. Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
51. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090.
52. See id. at 1091 (quoting multiple cases which state that the plain language of Title VII
indicates that its goal was to provide equal access to the job market for men and women).
53. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1120.
54. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091.
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discriminations which afford significant employment opportunities to
55
one sex in favor of the other” are objectionable. Seven federal courts
of appeals adopted the EFA56 in the 1970s and determined that
grooming standards were not such classifications but were instead a
“questionable application” of Title VII, not to be undertaken without
a “stronger Congressional mandate.”57
EFA advocates placed special emphasis on an employer’s right
to determine the dress code of its employees.58 The EFA decisions
recognized the enormous impact employee grooming can have on
59
businesses and viewed controlling it as a managerial responsibility,
like reducing theft loss or maximizing sales. Courts adopting the EFA
struggled with the same concerns as modern-day courts about the
ultimate result of forcing employers to eliminate dress code

55. Dodge v. Giant Food Co., 488 F.2d 1333, 1335 (D.D.C. 1973); see Fagan, 481 F.2d at
1123 (“It was not planned that the Act was ‘[to] be used to interfere in the promulgation and
enforcement of the general rules of employment, deemed essential by an employer, where the
direct or indirect economic effect upon the employee was nominal or non-existent.’” (quoting
Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 237–38 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (alteration in original)).
56. See Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (agreeing with the
Willingham line of cases); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976)
(adopting unanimous result of other circuits); Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349,
1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (adopting Willingham line of cases); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249
(8th Cir. 1975) (same); Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092 (“[D]istinctions . . . on the basis of
something other than immutable or protected characteristics do not inhibit employment
opportunity. . . . Congress sought only to give all persons equal access to the job market.”);
Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896–98 (9th Cir. 1974) (reviewing and agreeing with
the holding in Dodge and Fagan); Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1120–21 (establishing the initial reasoning
behind the EFA).
57. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090.
58. See Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1124 (“This court, without a far more certain mandate from
Congress than that contained in Title VII, will not be party to what it considers a ridiculous,
unwarranted encroachment on a fundamental right of employers, i.e., the right to prescribe
reasonable grooming standards which take cognizance of societal mores.” (quoting Willingham
v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (M.D. Ga. 1972))); id. at 1123 (“Congress by
this Act did not give the federal courts the task of deciding whether hair at the collar level or
one-half inch below is a bona fide occupational qualification. Such a suggestion is absurd; such a
task borders on the non-justiciable.” (quoting Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402,
404 (D.D.C. 1972))).
59. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1124–25 (“Perhaps no facet of business life is more important than a
company’s place in public estimation. That the image created by its employees dealing with the
public when on company assignment affects its relations is so well known that we may take
judicial notice of an employer’s proper desire to achieve favorable acceptance. Good grooming
regulations reflect a company’s policy in our highly competitive business environment.
Reasonable requirements in furtherance of that policy are an aspect of managerial
responsibility.”).
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60
distinctions based on gender norms. These courts tried to give
employers as much latitude as possible and only limit their rights
when absolutely necessary61 to avoid creating unequal employment
62
opportunities.
They determined that employer regulations only create unequal
employment opportunities and seriously impose upon employees
when they implicate immutable characteristics and fundamental
rights. According to the Supreme Court, “[d]iscriminatory preference
for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what
63
Congress has proscribed.” Title VII specifically prescribes that
employers not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or national
origin, all of which are immutable characteristics. Courts adopting the
EFA concluded that “logic dictates that sex is used in the same sense
[as race, color, and national origin] rather than to indicate personal
modes of dress or cosmetic effects.”64 Protecting employees from
discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s view that discrimination should not result
from “forces beyond [the employees’] control.”65
Prior cases addressing sex-plus discrimination, however, had
struck down regulations based on mutable characteristics, such as
66
67
marriage or motherhood. In order to reconcile these holdings and

60. See Willingham, 352 F. Supp. at 1020 (“It would be patently ridiculous to presume that
Congress ever intended” employers to have to allow men to wear dresses, “lipstick, eyeshadow,
earrings, and other items of typical female attire.”).
61. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092 (finding that “Congress sought only to give all persons
equal access to the job market, not to limit an employer’s right to exercise his informed
judgment as to how best to run his shop”).
62. See Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“Few would
disagree that an employer’s blanket exclusion of women from certain positions constitutes
‘discrimination’ within the meaning of Title VII. At the same time, few would argue that
separate toilet facilities for men and women constitute Title VII ‘discrimination.’ The line must
be drawn between these two extremes . . . .”).
63. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1119 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
64. Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1974).
65. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1125 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806
(1973) (alteration in original)).
66. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 615–16 (1971) (addressing
prohibition against women with small children); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194,
1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (addressing a no marriage rule for stewardesses).
67. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (reconciling the holdings
in Phillips and Sprogis).
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68
Title VII’s inclusion of religion, which is also mutable, the EFA
courts concluded that Congress must have also intended Title VII to
protect employees from discrimination on the basis of fundamental
69
rights. They therefore ultimately held that in all circumstances not
involving immutable characteristics or fundamental rights, which
include most grooming regulations,70 the employer’s right to control
its business outweighs the interests of its employees. Because job
applicants have complete control over hairstyles and modes of dress,
the EFA courts decided that discrimination on the basis of such
characteristics does not stand in the way of equal employment
opportunity and therefore is not proscribed by Title VII.
Finally, EFA advocates rejected the EEOC’s understanding that
71
sex-differentiated grooming standards are per se discriminatory.
They argued that the EEOC’s guidelines should only be given
deference when “[Title VII] and its legislative history support the
Commission’s construction.”72 Courts adopting the EFA held that
“neither [Title VII] nor its legislative history even remotely
predicated an instance of discrimination ‘because of sex’ on the length
of an employee’s hair”73 and concluded that they were “not obliged to
stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative

68. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1125 n.22.
69. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091 (“[A] line must be drawn between distinctions
grounded on such fundamental rights as the right to have children or to marry and those
interfering with the manner in which an employer exercises his judgment as to the way to
operate a business.”); Dodge v. Giant Food Co., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(distinguishing marriage from hair length by noting that “although neither marriage nor hair
length is an unalterable personal characteristic, marriage has a much more fundamental
importance to and effect upon an individual’s life”).
70. Several cases following the EFA noted the minimal effect of grooming regulations on
employees. See Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (“The prohibition of
sex discrimination must be interpreted in light of the purpose and intent of Congress in enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Employer grooming codes requiring different hair lengths for men
and women bear such a negligible relation to the purposes of Title VII that we cannot conclude
they were a target of the Act.”); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975)
(“[S]light differences in the appearance requirements for males and females have only a
negligible effect on employment opportunities.”) In both cases there was a policy for both men
and women, there was no evidence that the policies served as a pretext to exclude women from
employment on the basis of sex, and there was no evidence that women who failed to comply
with the policies were not also discharged.
71. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092 (relying on Fagan to rebut the argument that the
court should defer to the understanding of the EEOC).
72. Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1125 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971)).
73. Id.
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decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that
74
frustrate the Congressional policy underlying a statute.”
Many scholarly articles cite the EFA, many circuits still follow it,
and courts have used it within the last decade to strike down
75
grooming challenges. Proponents of the EFA articulate a narrow
goal for Title VII. They authorize employers to pass any sexdifferentiated grooming codes they choose, and they minimize the
impact that such codes may have on employees. By the mid-1970s,
numerous courts had addressed the issue of disparate grooming
standards. Courts began deferring to the reasoning of their
predecessors who had adopted the EFA and often offered little
76
analysis of their own. Employers instituting grooming codes
appeared to have the upper hand. Courts adopting the EFA,
however, had already laid the ground work for an alternate approach
to challenging such codes based on “unequal enforcement” or
“unequal burdens.”77
C. The Reasoning and Evolution of the Equity Approach
Under the equity approach grooming standards are not
prohibited by Title VII if they place equal burdens on male and
female employees. The EQA developed in the late 1970s and 1980s
out of the EFA notion that Title VII’s goal is equal employment
opportunity and only those distinctions which prohibit such
opportunity should be eliminated. The EQA relies heavily on EFA

74. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1988)).
75. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998)
(upholding hair length policy); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908–09 (2d Cir.
1996) (same); Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel Ltd., No. 99-3891T, 2000 US Dist. LEXIS 15960,
at *10 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000) (upholding failure to hire due to employer’s perception of
unnatural hair color); Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit Union, No. 86CV1944, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14475, at *6–7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987) (upholding no-earring requirement).
76. See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) (relying
solely on the reasoning of other circuits that had considered the question previously); Longo v.
Carlisle De Coppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Without necessarily adopting all of
the reasoning of those opinions, we are content to abide by this unanimous result.”).
77. See, e.g., Fountain, 555 F.2d at 756 (plaintiff arguing that “even if separate dress and
grooming regulations do not offend Title VII, unequal enforcement of these regulations does
violate the statute”); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that
slight differences in the appearance requirements for males and females are acceptable under
Title VII when they are “imposed in an evenhanded manner”); Willingham v. Macon Tel.
Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that if “both sexes are being screened
with respect to a neutral fact, i.e., grooming in accordance with generally accepted community
standards of dress and appearance,” each sex is treated equally).
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cases, but it has a distinct analysis. The first major victory under the
78
EQA came in 1979 in Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings and Loan,
which relied on three flight attendant cases to articulate a new
79
approach. In Carroll, the Seventh Circuit overturned a regulation
that required female but not male bank officers, tellers, and
managerial employees to wear coordinated uniforms.80 In addition to
requiring its female employees to wear the uniforms, the bank
withheld income tax on the basis of their cost and required the
employees to pay for the cost of their cleaning and maintenance.81
The EQA begins with a distinction based on sex. In Carroll “two
sets of employees performing the same functions [were] subjected on
the basis of sex to two entirely separate dress codes.”82 Courts
applying the EQA then seek to determine whether the distinction is a
monetary or psychological burden. For example, in Carroll, the code
forced female employees to bear a financial burden and a burden of
presumed lesser professional status that their male colleagues did not
have to bear.83 If one sex is more burdened then the other, the court
84
deems the regulation to be a violation Title VII.

78. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979). Carroll is
perhaps the second-most-cited case in the field after Willingham, and it is a rare example of
courts striking down an employer’s policy.
79. See In re Nat’l Airlines, Inc. 434 F. Supp. 269, 276 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (upholding weight
limitations imposed on flight attendants as valid appearance regulations, but engaging in
thorough consideration of the burdens on each party before doing so); Jarrell v. E. Air Lines,
430 F. Supp. 884, 893 (E.D. Va. 1977) (same); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 790
(D.D.C. 1973) (implying that prohibiting women but not men from wearing eyeglasses was an
unequal burden).
80. Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1029. Men were allowed to wear business attire of their choosing.
Id.
81. Id. at 1030.
82. Id. at 1032.
83. Id. at 1032–33. Although the uniforms themselves were professional, the fact that
women alone were required to wear them was demeaning. The natural tendency is to assume
that uniformed women have a lesser professional status than men allowed to choose their own
business attire. Id.
84. The holding in Carroll was also based on the fact that the uniforms were not grounded
in commonly accepted social norms, they were not reasonably related to the employer’s
business needs, and the employer had non-discriminatory alternatives to achieve its business
purpose. Id. at 1032–33. Other uniform cases have relied on the Carroll rationale. See
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266–67 (S.D. Ohio
1987) (invalidating a requirement that female employees wear smocks); EEOC v. Clayton Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, No. 80-1332C(4), 1981 WL 152, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 1981) (holding that
a female-only uniform policy is not a “reasonable personal grooming polic[y] imposed in an
evenhanded manner” and violates Title VII).
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The EQA rationale appeared in cases throughout the 1980s,
and the Ninth Circuit formalized the approach in 2000 when it held
that sex-differentiated appearance standards that impose unequal
burdens on men and women violate Title VII, whereas appearance
standards that impose different but essentially equal burdens on men
and women do not.86 Proponents of the EQA champion the same
narrow vision for Title VII as their EFA counterparts, but, unlike the
EFA, the EQA does not give unfettered discretion to employers. It
instead focuses on the impact that grooming standards may have on
employees. The EQA, like both the PSA and the EFA, deals
explicitly with dress and appearance claims, but the final approach
draws from the wider area of sex discrimination jurisprudence.
D. The Reasoning and Evolution of the Price Waterhouse
Stereotyping Approach
Under the Price Waterhouse stereotyping approach, sexdifferentiated grooming policies should not be allowed if they
perpetuate sexual stereotypes about how men and women should
look. The PWSA draws on the notion of “sexual stereotyping”
present throughout the first three approaches but is primarily
associated with the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Price Waterhouse

85. See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1379–80 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting a
disparate impact claim because the district court had discretion to find that the plaintiff “was
discharged because she failed to follow her employer’s instructions, applied evenhandedly to
males and females, with respect to a legitimate business concern”); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.,
766 F.2d 1205, 1205 (8th Cir. 1985) (addressing whether grooming requirements were applied
evenly to male and female newscasters); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175,
177 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a woman being told to “tone down” her attire was not disparate
treatment when men were given grooming cautions as well). Cf. Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F.
Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (analogizing a judge’s requirement that a lawyer wear a necktie
in court to the hair cases and holding that “[n]either case rises to the level of enforced
stereotyping by dress implicated in Carroll”). For more information on the controversial nature
of Craft, supra, see Patti Buchman, Note, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television
Anchorwomen on the Basis of Age-Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 190 (1985).
86. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854–55 (9th Cir. 2000). Not until 2004 did
the court begin to formally apply the “unequal burdens test” to traditional grooming and
appearance regulations. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Casino Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1080
(9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n Frank we characterized the weight standards at issue as ‘appearance
standards,’ . . . we have, as yet, had no occasion to apply the ‘unequal burdens’ test to genderdifferentiated dress and grooming requirements.”), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d
1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).

07__WILLIAMSON.DOC

2006]

WORKPLACE GROOMING STANDARDS

12/19/2006 5:12 PM

697

87
v. Hopkins. Price Waterhouse is the only Supreme Court case to
implicate sex and dress in the private workplace.88
The facts of Price Waterhouse are as follows: Ann Hopkins was a
senior manager in the accounting firm of Price Waterhouse and the
89
only woman among eighty-eight partnership candidates in 1982.
When Price Waterhouse neither accepted nor held over for
reconsideration Hopkins’ candidacy, she brought suit under Title VII
alleging that Price Waterhouse had engaged in discrimination
“because of sex” by “consciously giving credence and effect to
partners’ comments about her that resulted from sex stereotyping.”90
In addition to comments made inside the partnership meeting, a
partner personally advised Hopkins to “walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry.”91
The Court held that such comments were evidence that sex had
been a factor in the decision not to promote Hopkins92 and ruled in
93
her favor. The PWSA provides an additional reason why Title VII
should cover grooming and appearance regulation by tying such
regulations to sexual stereotypes and by identifying sexual
stereotypes as evidence of sex discrimination. Further, because
stereotypes are by their nature ingrained, the PWSA offers another
reason to curtail the amount of discretion given to employers to set
dress and appearance standards.
Following the decision in Price Waterhouse, “neither the Justices
nor the parties seem to have seen the Court as breaking new ground
on . . . questions of sex stereotyping” or its interaction with
94
grooming. Despite the fact that it was decided in 1989, grooming

87. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
88. The Supreme Court has addressed sex and dress in the context of public employees.
For a discussion of these cases which raise liberty and speech claims, see Klare, supra note 20, at
1402–11.
89. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233.
90. Id. at 228. Partners described Ann Hopkins as “aggressive” and “macho” and suggested
she “overcompensated for being a woman.” Id. at 235. She was advised to take “a course at
charm school,” and her use of profane language was criticized as unladylike. Id.
91. Id. at 235.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 228.
94. Case, supra note 18, at 36–37.
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scholars did not even address the case until well into the mid-1990s.
The Court had been condemning what it called “sex stereotyping”
since the early 1970s,96 and PSA, EFA, and EQA cases contain
language discussing the relationship between various grooming
97
policies and sexual stereotypes. Price Waterhouse validated the use
of this language and broke new ground by expanding the definition of
a sexual stereotype. Price Waterhouse corroborated the stereotype
language in earlier cases by emphasizing the legal relevance of
stereotyping98 and by providing a concrete link between stereotypes
99
and grooming, and between grooming and Title VII.
Price Waterhouse, however, has been far more controversial for
100
the way that it has broadened the definition of a sexual stereotype.
Pre–Price Waterhouse stereotyping focused on the “assumption that
an entire sex [or an individual of that sex] conformed to [a] gender
stereotype[],”101 and penalized that sex or individual on the basis of
that assumption.102 By contrast, Price Waterhouse stereotyping

95. See Bartlett, supra note 20 (failing to mention the case); Klare, supra note 20, at 1421
n.124 (mentioning the case briefly). Cf. Case, supra note 18, at 36 (calling the case the
“centerpiece of my discussion”).
96. See Case, supra note 18, at 37 (detailing the Court’s long history of condemning sex
stereotyping).
97. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1213 (8th Cir. 1985) (evaluating the
argument that the television stations standards discriminated against women by requiring them
to conform to stereotypes held by viewers); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1089 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Willingham’s position is that ‘sex plus’ must be read to intend to include
‘sex plus any sexual stereotype.’”); Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 665
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (“Such a dress policy . . . reflects a stereotyped attitude toward one of the
sexes.”).
98. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (“As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we
are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that
they matched the stereotype associated with their group.”).
99. See id. at 256 (“[I]f an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a
soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her
interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.”). Before Price Waterhouse, courts had
criticized this link. See Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1391–92 (W.D. Mo.
1979) (holding that the plaintiff’s contention that the no pants rule perpetuates a stereotype and
“a sexist, chauvinistic attitude in employment” is “simply a matter of opinion”).
100. Courts and scholars rarely distinguish between types of stereotyping. See Case, supra
note 18, at 37 (“Without explicitly acknowledging the fact, the Court, as it was faced with
increasingly subtle and complex barriers to the equality of the sexes, has gradually broadened its
conception of impermissible sex stereotyping, lumping together under the same general heading
several related but conceptually distinguishable phenomena.”).
101. Id.
102. Examples of such stereotyping include rejecting all women as firefighters based on the
stereotype that women are physically weak, and rejecting an individual woman for a sales
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penalizes individuals because their gender behavior does not conform
to stereotypical notions regardless of what gender behavior the job
103
requires.
Price Waterhouse, for example, discriminated against Ann
Hopkins because she was uncommonly aggressive for a woman and
because she did not dress in a feminine manner. The company did so
even though her position required aggressive behavior and, as the
success of her male colleagues illustrated, did not require make-up or
pastel suits. PWSA adherents argue that if Price Waterhouse could
not discriminate against Ann Hopkins for failing to wear lipstick or
pastel suits then other employers cannot discriminate against male or
female employees that fail to look like the employer, or perhaps
society, think a man or woman should look. Such employees might
include women who refuse to shave their legs, wear a bra, wear skirts,
wear makeup, or wear their hair long or styled and men who refuse to
cut their hair or want to wear jewelry.
Advocates of the PWSA seek to eradicate all dress and
appearance regulations based on sexual stereotypes and by doing so
give employees greater freedom to dress as they wish. PWSA
proponents do not address an employer’s interest in running its
business as it sees fit. The language in Price Waterhouse seems tailormade for grooming plaintiffs, but no one has ever successfully
invoked the decision in a traditional grooming case. Most post-1989
grooming cases are decided based on older rationales and
approaches.104

position on the assumption that because she is female she is not aggressive, without ever giving
her an opportunity to show that even if women as a whole are less aggressive then men, she is
not.
103. Case, supra note 18, at 37. An example of such stereotyping is refusing to hire a man
who appears abnormally sensitive and nurturing, regardless of fact that the job for which he is
applying requires such characteristics.
104. See, e.g., Wiseley v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., No. 03-1540, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14963,
*16–17 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2004) (refusing to analogize to Price Waterhouse because Harrah’s
haircut regulation did not target a specific individual in a protected class or deny employment
opportunity based on class status); Boyce v. Gen. Ry. Signal Co., No. 99-CV-6225T, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13709, at *9 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. June 10, 2004) (restricting Price Waterhouse to
situations in which the employer has mixed legitimate and illegitimate motives and noting that
the plaintiff had produced no evidence that the employer’s actions were motivated by a desire
to deny employment to men). See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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II. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY: LEARNING FROM EACH
FAILED APPROACH
Part I chronicled the development of the four existing
approaches to sex and grooming. These approaches articulate three
different goals for Title VII: getting rid of all sex based distinctions in
the workplace, eliminating only those distinctions that inhibit equal
employment opportunity, and eradicating distinctions based on post–
Price Waterhouse sexual stereotypes. They emphasize multiple
combinations of interests from almost entirely pro-employee to
extremely pro-employer. They range from doctrinally clear to legally
attenuated, and contain elements that are workable alongside
elements that are impracticable. No approach is considered “the
right” one. Part II examines the successes and failure of each
approach.
A. Learning from the Per Se Approach
The PSA is doctrinally clear but overly aspirational and
practically inapplicable because it fails to recognize and reasonably
accommodate employer interests and underestimates the negative
results of a genderless workplace. The PSA is doctrinally clear
because it adopts a plain meaning of the words “because of sex” in
Title VII105 and offers a logical analysis of the holdings in the sex-plus
106
cases. The PSA also offers a clear bright-line rule and avoids the
myriad problems associated with drawing a line between distinctions
which are tolerable and those which are not, including determining
who draws the line, how it is drawn, if the standard is objective or
subjective, and so on. Bright-line rules may reduce costly, time-

105. Under the PSA, “because of sex” is understood as “but for sex.” For example,
Donahue would have been able to wear his hair long but for being male. Donahue v. Shoe
Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972). Scholars disagree as to what the plain language
of Title VII requires. For a discussion favoring a per se interpretation in which violators of sexspecific grooming codes are “clearly protected by . . . the plain language of Title VII,” see Case,
supra note 18, at 7. Cf. Yuracko, supra note 16, at 170–71 (declaring that the text of Title VII is
“too sparse and indeterminate” to determine what sex-specific discrimination is actionable).
106. Unlike advocates of the EFA, advocates of the PSA do not have to limit their
interpretations of the holdings in Phillips and Sprogis to stereotypes that affect fundamental
rights. Compare supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text, with supra notes 67–69 and
accompanying text.
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consuming litigation and make it easier to draft employment policies
107
that will keep employers and employees out of court.
The PSA is aspirational because it requires employers to justify
every distinction based on sex, including arguably harmless
distinctions such as separate male and female locker rooms. It is
impractical because it requires a large shift in the status quo and does
108
not allow society to accommodate any sexual or gender norms.
“The laws outlawing sex discrimination are important . . . . They must
109
be realistically interpreted, or they will be ignored or displaced.”
Society continually accepts subtle changes in sex and gender norms,
but it fears drastic changes, such as the complete elimination of all sex
and gender norms, and it is likely to reject any approach that requires
such a change.
The PSA fails to recognize or accommodate an employer’s true
interest in the appearance of its employees. Employers care about
employee dress because employees are a business’s public face.
Customers form opinions about the employer on the basis of the
behavior and dress of the employee. Employers want employees to
display the behavior and dress that customers most prefer. The only
mechanism within the PSA that addresses the interest of the
employer is the BFOQ, which cannot accommodate concerns about
customer preference.110 For example, an employer may require his
female employees to wear a bra. Such a regulation is based on the sex
norm that the breasts of women typically are more prone to
movement, which may be distracting, than those of men. Although
the employer’s clients may prefer dealing with a female salesperson
wearing a bra, the employer cannot justify bra wearing as an essential
qualification in sales.
The PSA also fails to recognize the consequences to employees
of creating a workplace without discretionary distinctions based on
gender norms. When an employer cannot justify distinctions between
its male and female dress policies, it is faced with two difficult

107. Bright-line rules can also increase litigation costs. If every distinction is per se
discrimination it will be very easy for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
An employer will rarely succeed in a motion to dismiss and will likely only succeed at summary
judgment by asserting an iron clad BFOQ defense.
108. A sex norm is biological, such as the fact that “men can grow beards and women
typically cannot,” whereas a gender norm is socialized, such as the fact “that women wear
dresses in this society and men typically do not.” Case, supra note 18, at 10–11.
109. Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
110. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
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options. An employer may expand the grooming or clothing options
available to both sexes, for instance by allowing both male and female
employees to wear dresses, appear in makeup, and grow facial hair; or
an employer may narrow the options available to all employees and
create a universal, androgynous appearance code, for instance by
requiring all employees to wear slacks, flat shoes, and no makeup.111
The first option favors gender benders and many scholars praise it as
112
a means of elevating the traditionally feminine in society, but
contemporary employers are unlikely to choose it because it makes
them uncomfortable or they fear it will drive away clients or
customers.113
The second option would result in an outcome that is optimal for
114
no one and could actually be harmful to women. “[T]here is in fact
no dress, grooming, or trait requirement that does not burden
individuals of one sex more than the other,” and an androgynous
dress code allows fewer options “for men to gender bend [and] fewer
traditionally gender-conforming options for women.”115 Further, same
does not always mean equal, and requiring sameness may denigrate
female identity or eliminate forms of dress which have been
empowering to women. Consider the case of Cadet Sharon Faulkner,
who fought to be admitted to The Citadel without the traditional
knob haircut.116 Although a buzz cut on a man connotes masculinity, a
buzz cut on a woman may signify social and sexual deviance.117
Faulkner’s situation compares to that of a professional woman forced
by the strictures of her employer to wear a man’s pinstriped suit and a
tie.118 Policies attempting to be neutral may actually make it more
difficult to obtain equal opportunities in the workplace. Further,
although many scholars argue that female dress codes are patriarchal

111. See Yuracko, supra note 16, at 202 (identifying these options); see also Case, supra note
18, at 63 n.214 (discussing the concerns of an androgynous grooming code).
112. See Case, supra note 18, at 68 (“[O]ne of the most effective ways to improve the value
of something coded feminine . . . is to make it accessible to and acceptable in men.”).
113. Id. at 7–8.
114. Yuracko, supra note 16, at 203.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 199–201 (describing Sharon Faulkner’s case).
117. Id. at 200. Faulkner’s advocates argued that The Citadel “was proceeding ‘under the
guise of gender neutral grooming policies [that] implement rules which altogether denigrate Ms.
Faulkner’s identity as a woman.’” Id. (alteration in original).
118. See Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2552 (arguing that the “imitation man” look may force a
woman to look silly or sexy).
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and restrictive, other scholars tout the empowering aspects of female
119
dress.
B. Learning from the Employer Friendly Approach
The EFA is practical and acknowledges the true interests of
employers in grooming regulations, but it is doctrinally unclear and
fails to recognize the interests of employees or quantify the interests
of employers. The approach is doctrinally unclear because it cannot
successfully reconcile the sex-plus holdings. The argument that
Congress only intended Title VII to cover immutable characteristics
is inconsistent with the statute’s prohibition of religious
discrimination, and the argument that Congress also intended Title
VII to protect fundamental rights seems like an exercise in
constitutional rather than statutory interpretation. The EFA is
practical because it does not seek to eliminate all distinctions between
men and women in the workplace and focuses on the core goal of
Title VII: promoting equal employment opportunity. The EFA fails,
however, in the way that it determines which distinctions interfere
with equal employment opportunity.
The EFA is underinclusive and fails to recognize all the interests
of employees because courts applying the EFA incorrectly assume
that only distinctions on the basis of immutable traits and
120
fundamental rights affect equal employment opportunity and that
121
all other distinctions have a negligible impact. In reality, other
distinctions may affect equal employment opportunity if they place a
greater burden on one sex than another or disproportionately require
members of one sex to do something contrary to their sense of self.122

119. See, e.g., id. at 2548–56.
120. See Post, supra note 18, at 34 (“Willingham justifies . . . [its approach] on the grounds
that only [immutable characteristics and fundamental rights] are important enough to interfere
with the ‘equal employment opportunity’ that is said to be the essential purpose of Title VII.
But this justification is plainly misconceived.”). Post offers the example of being forced to live
within three miles of the workplace. Id. Such an indisputable example is much more difficult to
find in the grooming context because whether or not the requirement is a burden on the
employee is a more subjective inquiry. Whereas everyone agrees that being restricted in where
to live is a burden, minds differ as to whether being forced to dress like the majority is.
121. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 169 (1961) (“[I]n contrast with morals, the
rules of . . . dress . . . occupy a relatively low place in the scale of serious importance. They may
be tiresome to follow, but they do not demand great sacrifice.”), quoted in Bartlett, supra note
20, at 6 n.74.
122. Bayer, supra note 18, at 839–45 (stating that “Title VII is concerned with more than
merely traditional discrimination” based on mutability and is also concerned with the way in
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These effects are not negligible. It is inconsistent to assume that
dress and appearance are trivial to employees while simultaneously
123
reinforcing their importance to an employers’ business. If people
care about appearances when they are customers and clients, it is
likely that they care about them when they are employees.
Insignificance cannot be assumed; “whether dress and appearance
standards are trivial or significant depends upon the relationship
between the standard and the culture in which it is imposed.”124
Forcing a man to wear a kilt to a formal work function may be
deemed trivial by a Scottish judge, whereas an American judge may
deem the same man’s refusal to wear a tuxedo in the United States as
a significant departure from employer expectations and community
125
norms. Moreover, community norms are shifting in nature —forcing
a woman to wear a skirt everyday in 1964, at Title VII’s inception,
might have been trivial, but few women would find it so today.126
If insignificance is not fixed, someone must define it based on his
or her own perceptions and norms, and courts are not the appropriate
parties to do so. The Supreme Court’s holdings indicate that sex has
no legitimate place in the employment realm unless it is justified as a
statutory exception or as part of an affirmative action program, and
that it is not the job of courts to determine what uses of sex are
“useful,” “not useful,” “worthwhile,” or “outmoded.”127 If Title VII

which race, sex, and national origin implicate the sense of self”). “[R]ace, color, sex and national
origin,” as enumerated in Title VII, can be read broadly as examples of things which implicate a
person’s sense of self rather than as an exclusive list of prohibitions. See id. at 839 (“If we
recognize that individual dignity, personal freedom, and sense of self are often intimately tied to
mutable characteristics, then we must criticize the cavalier fashion with which courts dismiss
individuals’ claims that employers’ racially, sexually, or ethnically premised rules unjustly
restrict personal integrity and expression.”). The mutability of a trait tells one nothing about its
importance to the sense of self. Id.
123. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2558 (stating that it is ridiculous to “categorically assume[]
that the interests of employees will always be less weighty than those of the employer”); see also
Klare, supra note 20, at 1419 (“[T]hat productive efficiency requires deference to managerial
discretion . . . is casually stated as a premise, with little effort being made in the cases to
persuade that it is actually true.”).
124. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2559.
125. Id. at 2569 (noting that community norms are “interactional or relational” and that
Title VII is about “steering and steadying a moving target” rather than determining a fixed,
permanent meaning).
126. See Case, supra note 18, at 66 n.224 (describing a California law that prohibits this
practice).
127. See Bayer, supra note 18, at 856 (relying on Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), and Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073
(1983), to demonstrate the inappropriateness of courts categorizing stereotypes).
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did not intend for courts to make such determinations, it likely did
not intend them to be able to discard certain instances of sex
discrimination as insignificant, as courts applying the EFA have
128
done.
The EFA is overinclusive because it fails to quantify employer
interests and balance employee interests. Courts applying the EFA
allow employers to implement distinctions between employees
regardless of how little or how much employers need those
distinctions for their business. Under the EFA, employers are allowed
to condemn all employees who violate “established gender grooming
and dress conventions” even when their violations do not negatively
129
impact the employers. Judges view employees who refuse to change
mutable characteristics at their employer’s request and who
“willful[ly] deviat[e] from customary norms of gender appearance” as
social deviants.130 As a result, judges applying the EFA allow
employers to regulate appearance in any way they choose “so long as
[their] judgment represents an effort to satisfy [their version of]
community norms.”131 For example, an employer could prohibit male
employees from wearing earrings even if the majority of the
employer’s customers and clients were ambivalent about male
earrings.
C. Learning from the Equity Approach
The EQA, unlike its predecessors, acknowledges the significance
of grooming and appearance standards to both employers and
employees. Like the EFA, the EQA is practical and limits its reach to
outlawing distinctions that create unequal employment opportunities.
Nevertheless, the EQA fails because it is difficult to apply objectively.
The approach can also be criticized for allowing employers
unnecessary latitude to impose sexist polices on both sexes and for
relying too heavily on cultural norms.
The EQA acknowledges the true significance of grooming to
employers by allowing them to impose codes that incorporate
customer preferences based on gender and sex norms. A grooming
code is permissible if “both sexes are being screened with respect to a

128. See, e.g., supra note 55 and accompanying text.
129. Post, supra note 18, at 34.
130. Id. at 35.
131. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2557 (emphasis added).
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neutral fact, i.e., grooming in accordance with generally accepted
132
community standards of dress and appearance.” The EQA also
recognizes the extent of employee interests, and therefore
acknowledges that polices that do not implicate fundamental rights or
immutable traits, such as the uniform policy in Carroll, may still
impose financial or psychological burdens on employees and affect
equal employment opportunities.
The EQA is difficult for courts to apply because it requires
plaintiffs to identify and prove a burden objectively. Outside of not
getting hired, fired, or promoted, every person may have his or her
own idea of what constitutes a burden. Carroll seems to indicate that
burdens may be financial, like the cost of cleaning a uniform, or
psychological, like the feeling of being considered less professional
133
than one’s opposite sex colleagues, but people can consider other
things like time and inconvenience to be burdens as well.
Psychological feelings such as inferiority and unquantifiable notions
like inconvenience vary by person. If courts applying the EQA allow
plaintiffs to subjectively define their burdens and take their individual
preferences into account, they may create lengthy, fact-intensive
litigation that makes it more difficult for employers to foresee which
policies may create problems and to craft workable solutions. An
individual plaintiff’s
objection to [a grooming requirement], without more, [cannot] give
rise to a claim . . . under Title VII. If we were to [allow such a claim],
we would come perilously close to holding that every grooming,
apparel, or appearance requirement that an individual finds
personally offensive, or in conflict with his or her own self-image,
134
can create a triable issue of sex discrimination.

On the other hand, if courts decide based on an objective “reasonable
person” standard they may underestimate burdens as a whole and
isolate nonconformists in cases in which grooming is inextricably
entwined with notions of sexual orientation and gender conformity.135
It is also difficult for plaintiffs and courts to equate a male
burden with a female burden without resorting to arbitrary

132. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975).
133. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979).
134. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
135. See Klare, supra note 20, at 1420 (noting that a “community standard” discriminates
against non-conformers who “reject or mock dominant expectations”).
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136
nominalism. For instance, how does one determine if men and
women are subject to equal burdens when men are required to
remain clean shaven? Although women may have facial hair, a
woman’s facial hair is biologically different from a man’s. A male
plaintiff protesting the shaving requirement may try to name his
burden as having to shave his face and point out that women do not
have this burden. A defending employer may name the burden as
maintaining a well-groomed face and point to female burdens such as
applying makeup, waxing brows or lips, and controlling blemishes.
The outcome may turn completely on this arbitrary naming game.137
With nonbiological traits the game may become even more difficult as
policies force plaintiffs and courts to evaluate distinctly imposed
sexual meanings. Assume for instance that an employer prohibits
clothing that exudes sexuality. “[T]here is no consensus on exactly
what kind of dress is provocative,” and employers likely base their
workplace policies on their subjective belief about what should be
impermissible.138 Even if the employer, the employee, and the court
can agree on what should be disallowed for one sex, for instance low
cut blouses or tight skirts on women, they cannot frame the cross-sex
equivalent.139 If men are generally not considered sexy in tight skirts
and low-cut blouses, what clothing choices can an employer prohibit
so as to impose a burden on them as well?
One can also criticize the EQA for giving employers latitude to
impose sexist policies on both sexes as long as the policies are equally
sexist. For example, under the EQA an employer could not require
its female employees to meet stricter weight requirements than male
employees. The employer likewise could not require male employees

136. Yuracko, supra note 16, at 188 (noting that “[i]n a gendered society, women and men
simply cannot possess the same trait in precisely the same way” and thus the equal burdens
approach becomes a “nominalism game whose outcome depends on how one names the trait at
issue and frames the cross-sex comparison”).
137. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Harrah’s
contends that the burden of the makeup requirement must be evaluated with reference to all of
the requirements of the policy, including those that burden men only, such as the requirement
that men maintain short haircuts and neatly trimmed nails. Jespersen contends that the only
meaningful appearance standard against which the makeup requirement can be measured is the
corresponding ‘no makeup’ requirement for men. We agree with Harrah’s approach.”), vacated
and reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.
2006).
138. Klare, supra note 20, at 1399–1400.
139. See Yuracko, supra note 16, at 192 (discussing the problem of prohibitions against sexy
dress).
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to meet stricter body fat percentage and muscle definition
requirements than female employees. The employer could, however,
require male employees to comply with the second policy and female
employees to comply with the first if the employer could show that
the burden of complying with each policy was the same.
One can further criticize the EQA because it allows employers to
defer completely to culturally accepted gender norms. Culturally
accepted gender norms may themselves be subjective and
140
discriminatory and may intrinsically impose unequal burdens. Many
people view community norms as sexist and patriarchal,141 and feel
that the burden of conforming to them falls more harshly on women
then on men. For example, community norms often judge women
more harshly on appearance142 and weight.143 Proponents of this view
often reference the case of Christine Craft. Craft was a news-anchor
in the 1980s and her station required her to follow a “clothing
calendar” and to undergo extensive consulting before ultimately
demoting her from co-anchor to reporter because she failed to meet
the public’s ideal of a “professional anchor woman.”144 The station’s
dress code applied to men and women, but the community’s view of
professionalism caused it to fall more harshly on women.145
D. Learning from the Price Waterhouse Stereotyping Approach
The PWSA successfully recognizes that stereotypes can burden
employees and restrict equal employment opportunity. The approach
140. See Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2568 (“[C]ommunity norms [do not] operate[] as
objective, neutral principles on which to base the legal definition of equality . . . .”).
141. For example, the notion of women in skirts may be based on an understanding “that
[women] are better suited for less active or assertive roles” and that they “should enhance their
allure as sex objects.” Klare, supra note 20, at 1419.
142. See Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1378 (7th Cir. 1987) (illustrating the
plaintiff’s concern that her employer’s understanding of professional dress fell more harshly on
women); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1214 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[V]iewers—
particularly other women—criticize women more severely than men for their appearance on
camera and . . . women’s dress is more complex and demanding because ‘society has made it
that way.’”); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Mr.
Marcovsky felt that her clothes were . . . not in keeping with the department’s policy of dressing
in a conservative style.” (emphasis added)).
143. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2562–63 (discussing the flight attendant weight cases).
144. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1209.
145. Id. (“[A] telephone survey of some 400 randomly selected persons . . . . asked to rank
Craft in comparison with the female coanchors at KMBC’s competitors . . . [on] the dress of and
image of a ‘professional anchor woman’ . . . suggested that Craft was having an extremely
adverse impact on KMBC’s acceptance among Kansas City viewers.”).
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also begins to quantify employee interest in grooming and
appearance. The PWSA falls short, however, because it is overly
broad, doctrinally unclear, and does not recognize an employer’s
interests in grooming and appearance.
The PWSA provides a fuller picture of the motive behind
sexually disparate grooming codes. The codes are not the product of
malicious intent, like many other forms of sex discrimination. They
are the unintentional byproduct of culturally ingrained ideas about
the sexes. Proponents of the PWSA recognize and affirm that these
ideas can give rise to unequal employment opportunities just like
more blatant forms of sex discrimination and must be closely
monitored. The PWSA quantifies the employee’s interest by looking
not only at the burden of the rule on the employee subjectively, but
also at the objective burden on the employee’s ability to perform his
or her job. Wearing feminine clothing was a burden on Ann Hopkins
personally and it restrained her ability to perform at work by
curtailing her ability to be professionally aggressive.
The PWSA is overly broad because it has the effect of judicially
extending Title VII protection to discrimination against gays,
lesbians, transgendered individuals, and other sexual minorities
contrary to the will of Congress.146 Plaintiffs have rarely invoked the
PWSA in traditional grooming litigation. The approach has been far
more successful in protecting gender nonconformists from sexual
harassment147 and has been marginally successful in extending
employment protections to cross-dressers diagnosed with Gender
148
Identity Disorder (GID). Smith v. City of Salem is a recent example
149
of such a success. There the Sixth Circuit held that Title VII

146. For a list of multiple failed attempts to create federal protection for sexual orientation,
see Sunish Gulati, Note, The Use of Gender-Loaded Identities in Sex-Stereotyping Jurisprudence,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2177, 2196 n.87 (2003).
147. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (successfully
utilizing PWSA in a Title VII action against an employer for harassment based on sex
stereotypes); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999)
(analyzing PWSA in an action against an employer for retaliation and discrimination). See
generally Geoffrey S. Trotier, Dude Looks Like a Lady: Protection Based on Gender
Stereotyping Discrimination as Developed in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, 20 LAW
& INEQ. 237 (2002) (asserting that gender roles are no longer separated into a male/female
dichotomy).
148. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
149. See id. at 575 (“[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual—and therefore
fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from the discrimination
directed against Ann Hopkins.”).
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prohibited adverse employment action against a male, transsexual
firefighter diagnosed with GID. The fire department could not
discriminate against the man for exhibiting a more feminine
appearance at work because the holding in Price Waterhouse protects
150
employees who fail to act or identify with their gender. Plaintiffs
like Smith rely on the Supreme Court’s interchangeable use of the
151
words “gender” and “sex” in Price Waterhouse and the considerable
overlap between gender nonconformity and sexual orientation.152
The PWSA is doctrinally vague because it extends protection to
stereotypes that do not create unequal employment opportunity. The
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse was concerned about the
partners forcing Ann Hopkins to comply with feminine stereotypes
because such compliance would hinder her ability to be successful in
her job. Hopkins was caught in a double bind: her employer required
that she comply with feminine stereotypes and be professionally
successful in order to make partner, but she could not achieve one
without giving up the other. The PWSA goes beyond the actual
holding of Price Waterhouse and prohibits employers from requiring
any stereotypical behavior from their employees. To illustrate, under
a true reading of Price Waterhouse, a nursery school could not require
its male teachers to be brusque and aggressive when successful
nursery school teachers are kind and nurturing, but it could require its
janitors to behave in a stereotypically masculine manner because
displaying feminine characteristics is not essential to success on a
cleaning crew. Inconsistent with Price Waterhouse, the PWSA
assumes that an employer could not do the latter.
The PWSA fails in the same way as the PSA with regard to
recognizing an employer’s interest in the grooming and appearance of
its employees. Prohibiting an employer from forcing its employees to
comply with gender stereotypes is equivalent to prohibiting an
employer from forcing its employees to comply with community
norms. Something is a stereotype because it is commonly thought to
be the norm. Both approaches fail to recognize that employers have
an interest in pleasing their customers and clients, which often means

150. Id.
151. See Case, supra note 18, at 10 (identifying the consequences of “sex” and “gender”
being used interchangeably in the law).
152. See Gulati, supra note 146, at 2199 (discussing how courts often confuse gender and
sexual orientation).
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presenting an image through its employees that makes its customers
and clients comfortable.
III. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF YESTERDAY TO CREATE A
NEW APPROACH
A present-day plaintiff bringing a sexually disparate grooming
case inherits thirty-five years of grooming litigation relying on four
distinct legal approaches. Some of this so-called grooming litigation
really implicates other issues entirely, such as 1970s long hair as a
challenge to authority or the lack of legislation to protect sexual
minorities from discrimination and harassment. The remaining
grooming cases fail to reconcile the different goals and emphases of
the four approaches or fail to recognize that there are distinct
approaches at all, and courts pick and choose language and holdings
to fit their purposes. The result for a modern-day plaintiff is a
decision, often favoring the defendant, which seems more like a
cobbling together of cases than a well-reasoned exercise in justice.
Jespersen provides an excellent example of such a jumbled
opinion. It incorporated and intermingled cases from several time
periods and approaches and referenced a line of sexual minority cases
that have nothing to do with grooming at all. There, the court relied
on numerous haircut cases decided under the EFA for the
proposition that employers may differentiate among male and female
employees with respect to grooming,153 while also analyzing a makeup
policy under the EQA. It cited an out-of-circuit EFA/EQA case for
the proposition that a grooming policy must be reviewed holistically
rather than piecemeal,154 while ignoring PSA and EQA cases decided
inside and outside the Ninth Circuit that imply the opposite.155

153. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
154. Id. at 1112 (“Defendant’s hair length requirement for male employees is part of a
comprehensive personal grooming code applicable to all employees.” (citing Knott v. Mo. Pac.
R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975))).
155. See Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 665 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (“This
court holds, therefore, that an employee dress and grooming code, whether written or
unwritten, wherein the allowable length of hair is different for male and female employees is
discrimination on the basis of sex within the meaning of Section 703(a) of the Act.”); see also
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266–67 (S.D. Ohio
1987) (striking down a smock requirement that was part of a dress code for male and female
employees); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 790 (D.D.C. 1973) (evaluating
policies such as eyeglasses, height, and weight individually), overruled on other grounds, 567
F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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The court distinguished Harrah’s makeup policy from a weight
policy that it had previously struck down because the enforcer of the
latter policy admitted that its goal was to compete by having its
156
customers served by attractive women. Yet, the court never seemed
to consider that the admission was made in 1982, a time when
employers likely felt they could be more explicit about such business
strategies. Nor did the court really ask why Harrah’s needed its
female employees to wear make-up. The court rejected Darlene
Jespersen’s sexual stereotyping argument by distinguishing her
situation from that of Ann Hopkins, and yet it still felt compelled to
distinguish a line of cases in which sexual minorities successfully
alleged harassment under a Price Waterhouse sexual stereotyping
theory.157 The court ultimately held that Darlene Jespersen had failed
to present evidence that Harrah’s policies placed an unequal burden
on women or that Harrah’s designed its policy to perpetuate a sexual
stereotype. The Jespersen decision leaves its readers scratching their
heads. What did the Ninth Circuit accomplish by allowing an
employer to enforce a policy whose true benefits are unclear and that
requires an exemplary employee to undergo a ritual, wholly unrelated
to her core job functions, which many American women find to be
stereotypical, antiquated, and unnecessary?
To avoid future head-scratching, courts and scholars must pick
among the possible goals articulated in existing approaches. They
must clearly identify and quantify all of the interests involved in order
to properly balance them. Any resulting approach should also seek to
be doctrinally clear, practically applicable, and based on precedent
that truly addresses grooming and appearance. The Part II analysis of
the four existing approaches reveals that the most workable future
approach will be one that (1) adopts the goal of equal employment
opportunity; (2) recognizes that employees have a special interest in
their grooming and appearance that they do not have in other terms
and conditions of employment, but does not seek to quantify this
interest on an employee-by-employee basis; (3) understands that
employee appearance may severely impact the success of an
employer’s business but puts the burden on the employer to prove the
degree of this impact; (4) provides a mechanism for balancing the

156. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 (discussing the weight policy for female stewardesses that
the Ninth Circuit declared impermissible in Gerdom v. Cont’l Airline, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th
Cir. 1982)).
157. Id. at 1112–13.
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degree of objective interest on the part of the employee with the
degree of impact on the employer; and (5) places the sexual minority
and haircut lines of cases in the appropriate perspective.
A. One Goal and a Mechanism for Achieving It
Equal employment opportunity is the core of Title VII and must
be the goal of any new approach to grooming and appearance. The
PSA failed to gain judicial acceptance because it was premised on an
unreasonable goal—the elimination of every grooming distinction
between men and women in the workplace. It made no room to
consider customers’ preference for employees that dress according to
sex and gender norms,158 nor did it consider any of the negative results
of removing norms completely from the workplace.159 Further, judges
are people too, and they are no more capable of enforcing a world
without gender distinctions than employers and their customers are
capable of envisioning one.160 The PWSA continues to fail because it
has lost sight of the goal of the decision on which it was based. The
Supreme Court rejected the stereotypes that Price Waterhouse forced
onto Ann Hopkins because they limited her ability to do her job.
Price Waterhouse rejected stereotypes that create unequal
employment opportunity. Eliminating all sexual stereotypes, like
eliminating all stereotypes, if possible, is a goal for another day and
another law.
Any future approach must recognize that employees have a
special interest in their grooming and appearance that they do not
have in other terms and conditions of employment. This interest goes
beyond the mutability and fundamental rights concerns of the EFA
and is present regardless of the burdens placed on each sex.
Grooming and appearance are the ways that each individual signals to
the world his or her feelings and associations. Clothing or grooming
practices can covey conformity, threat, sexual liberation, objection to

158. Under the PSA every distinction must be justified as a BFOQ, and customer
preference is not a valid BFOQ. See supra Part I.A.
159. See supra Part II.A.
160. This argument could also be made about the ability to envision a race-blind world
following the passage of Title VII or a world in which women were not summarily excluded
from certain job categories. However, although there is no reason to distinguish between a black
man and a white man in terms of employment or a man and a woman in terms of capability,
there are nondiscriminatory reasons to distinguish in terms of dress, including the biological
differences in male and female bodies.
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authority, or an association with a particular group or subculture.
Because grooming and appearance practices are connected to an
employee’s sense of self rather than merely to his or her identity as a
worker, they are important to an employee in a way that other terms
and conditions of employment, like a better office or more vacation,
are not. The problems with the EQA illustrate that these subjective
interests are difficult to quantify in litigation. They are even more
difficult for an employer to understand when it is hiring or setting
employment policies that apply to everyone. Any future approach
must recognize the subjective interests of employees but have an
objective means of quantifying them.
One objective measure to begin with may be whether the
grooming or appearance regulation of the employer restrains the
employees’ abilities to express themselves outside the workplace as
well as within the workplace. Under this rule a regulation restricting
hair length would be impermissible because employees cannot adjust
the natural length of their hair by leaving the workplace. By contrast,
a regulation requiring men and women to wear different uniforms at
work would be permissible. This rule might prove inept against
regulations like makeup, which theoretically can be removed or
applied but which could create skin problems or conditions that might
afflict an employee at home and at work.
Likewise, any new approach must recognize the unique interests
of employers in a way that the PSA and PWSA do not. An employer
is concerned with its bottom line, which depends on the opinions of
clients and customers. Clients and customers are either individuals or
enterprises made up of individuals. Many of these individuals prefer
to interact with people who comply with sex and gender norms either
because of their own sensibilities or because of the sensibilities and
perceptions of their clients and customers. If the law is going to
recognize that grooming and appearance are important to employees
because it allows them to convey messages such as threat or
nonconformity, the law cannot ignore that when employees convey
161
these messages at work they may be speaking for their employers.
Cultural norms in the form of customer preference cannot be
relied on blindly, however. As critiques of the EQA point out,

161. Post, supra note 18, at 5–6 (“Employers thus quite reasonably objected to the theme of
self-expression on the grounds that ‘[i]f someone looks and acts as if they don’t care what others
think, they risk being rejected.’” (quoting Jane Meredith Adams, California City Faces Raging
Dress Code War, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 1992, at C4)).
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screening both sexes with regard to cultural norms can be problematic
when cultural norms are often themselves patriarchal and inherently
disadvantage women. Any approach that does not examine
community norms and “attempt[] to identify the cultural meanings
underlying them and determin[e] to what extent they impose burdens
that disadvantage members of one sex in relation to the other”162 may
163
fail to live up to Title VII’s legacy. Cultural norms, however, are
difficult to define, as they are largely shifting and contextual. In the
years when pants were transitioning from inappropriate to
appropriate female workplace dress, there were likely large
disparities in the cultural norm, differing from region to region and
industry to industry. As the critique of the EFA emphasizes, it should
not be left to the unfettered discretion of the employer to determine
what the cultural norms of its customer base are.164 To the extent that
the employer’s notions are outdated, neither the employer nor the
employee will benefit.
One step in the right direction may be to require employers to
justify the sex-differentiated grooming codes that employees most
object to with objective evidence of the cultural norms of their client
base. Courts have recognized a BFOQ of customer preference in a
165
limited number of circumstances. Courts could carve out a BFOQ
for customer preferences based on cultural norms in the limited area
of dress and appearance claims. The burden of proof would rest with
the employer. It might prove such norms by survey, and the data
could be collected by consumer and business interest groups in the
same way that they collect data about other customer desires.
Even if a new approach is able to identify and quantify employer
and employee interests, it must have a practical mechanism for
balancing such interests in the case of a conflict. A possible
mechanism might take the shape of the following: An employee
would contest a sex-differentiated policy by presenting objective
evidence of a distinction in treatment of male and female employees

162. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 2569.
163. See Whisner, supra note 20, at 84 (“When ‘commonly accepted social norms’
disadvantage women, the countenancing of an employment practice that takes its justification
from those norms defeats the purpose of a statute proscribing sex discrimination.” (footnote
omitted)).
164. See supra Part II.B.
165. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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166
based on a gender, not a sex norm, and evidence that the distinction
created unequal employment opportunities. A distinction would be
assumed to create unequal employment opportunities if it came
within the rules created to objectively measure employee interest,
such as if it impacted an employee’s dress and appearance outside of
the workplace. Employees would also be able to present any evidence
of subjective harm, provided that they informed the employer of the
harm at the time it implemented the policy. An employer could
defeat an employee’s claim by showing that the distinction was not
based on a gender norm, that it did not impact equal employment
opportunity, or that the employee had not informed it of the
subjective harm. An employer could also assert an affirmative
defense of customer preference in the vein of a BFOQ that the
employer would have the burden to prove using objective data
gathered in a manner that meets the court’s evidentiary standards.

B. The Problematic Legacy of the Haircut Cases and
Price Waterhouse
Two groups of cases are frequently connected to the issue of sex
and dress and often cloud the analysis. The haircut cases address
claims, primarily from the 1970s, by male employees that their
employers’ policies of prohibiting men but not women from wearing
long hair violate Title VII. The sexual minority cases address claims
by gay, lesbian, or transgendered employees that the holding in Price
Waterhouse prohibits employers from taking any adverse action
against them because they are not conforming to stereotypes about
their sex or gender. Courts must keep the haircut cases in appropriate
perspective by recognizing that they implicated challenges to
authority as much, if not more than, they implicated sex in the
workplace. Meanwhile, courts must understand that although the
sexual minority cases rely on the stereotyping language in Price
Waterhouse, they do not primarily implicate grooming and
appearance. Making this distinction is often difficult because of the
overlap between grooming and appearance and the expression of
sexual or gender preference.

166. Examples of policies based on sex norms might include rules based on modesty and
indecent exposure statutes, like bathing suit regulations or rules built around the distinct shape
of male and female bodies, such as a bra requirement for women.
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Both the PSA and the EFA developed almost exclusively by
relying on cases addressing male hair length. The outcome of the
haircut cases established the rule that employers may impose
167
different grooming standards on male and female employees.
Modern courts continue to rely on this rule and the great number of
cases articulating it without looking at the analyses or the facts behind
it. Further, the haircut cases established this rule early in the
evolution of grooming jurisprudence, and subsequent approaches
attempted to work within it. As a result, these holdings wield a great
deal of power. Courts must remember, however, that the plaintiffs in
these cases were likely as concerned with challenging authority as
with challenging sexism. For example, the plaintiffs in Aros were
young, male, college students, in the early days of Title VII. At that
time challenges were likely to come from African Americans or
women, and the court ultimately concluded that the students were
discharged not because of sexual bias but because of “their propensity
to linger in the halls too often and enter parts of the plant where they
didn’t belong, and their failure to report back when they had
completed an assignment.”168
The opinion spoke less about the relationship between sex and
workplace appearance and more about the visceral connection
between long hair and “youth, campus riots, unemployed hippies and
169
‘troublemakers.’” Plaintiffs challenged hair length on constitutional
grounds during the same period, and the opinions universally
discussed the connection between hair length and the expression of
controversial ideas.170 Courts and scholars must not disregard the
connection between long hair and social protest when reading the
outcome of these cases as precedent. Had plaintiffs challenged a

167. For an example of the lasting impact of the haircut cases, see Jarrell v. Eastern Air
Lines, 430 F. Supp. 884, 891 (E.D. Va. 1977) (“There is virtual unanimity among the Circuit
Courts of Appeals that an employer may impose reasonable personal appearance requirements
upon its employees and such standards need not be identical for males and females. Such
practices are said to be non-sexually discriminating. The plaintiffs’ efforts to distinguish these
so-called ‘hair-length’ cases are not persuasive.”).
168. Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 667 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
169. Id. at 666. The court in Donahue likewise linked “style of dress, hair length, and other
superficial features” with race, color, and national origin, and proclaimed that the “tendency to
stereotype people is at the root of some of the social ills that afflict the country.” Donahue v.
Shoe Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
170. See, e.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 621 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting) (discussing hair as a personal matter and a fundamental right). For a discussion of
additional claims, see Klare, supra note 20, at 1402–11.
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grooming standard that more directly implicated sex early on, like
rules prohibiting women from wearing pants, early approaches may
have developed differently.
Likewise, courts must attempt to separate the issue of grooming
from the issue of sexual orientation and gender identity and
understand the sexual minority cases “as primarily implicating sexual
orientation, more than sex.”171 As discussed previously, the
stereotyping discussion in Price Waterhouse has been far more
frequently linked to and far more successful at addressing
discrimination against sexual minorities than grooming.172 Yet most
contemporary grooming plaintiffs assert the PWSA because it is both
more recent and more plaintiff friendly than alternative approaches.
The association between grooming claims and sexual minorities,
however, confuses the analysis. Many sitting on the bench are still
disturbed173 by the notion of male workers “wear[ing] nail polish and
dresses and speak[ing] in falsetto and minc[ing] about in high heels”174
or female attorneys with legs unshaved presenting before the court.175
Judges and the public are not universally accepting of gender
nonconformists, and many do not view discrimination against such
individuals in the same way as discrimination on the basis of race,
176
biological sex, or national origin. Many fear that plaintiffs are trying
to use the stereotyping language in Price Waterhouse to bootstrap
sexual orientation and gender nonconformity protection into Title
VII177 contrary to the express intent of Congress,178 and are

171. Carbado et al., supra note 7, at 136. This is admittedly difficult to do as individuals
frequently express their gender identity or signal their sexual orientation through their
appearance, and grooming serves as a gender identifier to other individuals and to society as a
whole. Children from a young age identify people’s sex based on their outward appearance
rather than their biological makeup.
172. See supra Part I.D.
173. Fears about the man in a dress have been present since the 1970s. See supra note 60.
174. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (Posner, J., dissenting).
175. During oral arguments in Jespersen, a Ninth Circuit judge asked, “Can a law firm fire a
female associate for failing to shave her legs?” Carbado et al., supra note 7, at 127.
176. For a discussion of the issues that surround the transgendered, see generally
Transgender Law & Policy Institute, http://www.transgenderlaw.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
177. See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 246 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(addressing a female hairstylist who claimed she was not promoted because she was perceived
as butch). “[W]hat Dawson’s theory seeks to do is to ‘bootstrap protection for sexual
orientation into Title VII . . .’ under the guise of sexual stereotyping.” Id. at 315 (quoting
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)).
178. See Case, supra note 18, at 64 (noting that Congress in the ADA explicitly excludes
from the protection of the Act “virtually every conceivable form of a man in a dress—whether
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immediately suspicious when plaintiffs rely on it. Using “Price
Waterhouse” and “grooming” in the same sentence immediately
179
conjures up the “specter of the man in dress,” which creates
problems for a more traditional grooming use of the PWSA.
The sexual minority cases are an outgrowth of the absence of a
federal legal framework to protect sexual minorities. Title VII does
not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination or discrimination
against the transgendered, yet these individuals are often subject to
incredibly hostile work environments. Judges and legal scholars are
not immune to the horrible facts of these cases. In making the
connection between the “sexual stereotyping” language in Price
Waterhouse and the atypical gender and sexual behavior of many
sexual minorities, courts were likely looking for a way to provide
180
redress in the face of Congress’s refusal to do so. The subset of gays
and lesbians most likely to be subjected to physical harm or severe
verbal harassment are those whose behavior or appearance are
contrary to what society expects of their sex. The sexual orientation
of those conforming to society’s expectations is less likely to be
known, and other employees are less likely to feel threatened by or
uncomfortable around someone whom they perceive to be acting
“normally.”
A theory like Price Waterhouse and the PWSA based on gender
nonconformity serves the goal of protecting those gays and lesbians
most in need of protection without extending protection to sexual
orientation as a whole and overtly flouting the wishes of Congress.
Perhaps this is the reason that so many judges have been willing to
use it in the area of same-sex sexual harassment even though they
have failed to use it in traditional grooming cases. Grooming scholars
and courts addressing grooming claims should read the sexual
minority cases with this context in mind and should divorce this use of
Price Waterhouse from what the case may have to say about
traditional grooming claimants. After all, Ann Hopkins was a

transvestite, transsexual, suffering from gender-identity disorder, or homosexual”); Gulati,
supra note 146, at 2196 n.87 (listing all the Congressional attempts to pass a law protecting
sexual orientation).
179. Case, supra note 18, at 8.
180. Carbado, et al., supra note 7, at 136–37. Such judicial activism could be seen as
analogous to the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans, 516 U.S. 620 (1996), to use a new
heightened rational basis review to assess under Equal Protection a law implicating gay rights.
Id. at 137.
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heterosexual woman and did not dress in a manner so far removed
from the mainstream.
CONCLUSION
When one examines sex and grooming precedent from 1964 to
2006 chronologically and as distinct from other areas of sex
discrimination, several lessons emerge. Four approaches to grooming
and appearance exist, each with a distinct analysis. These approaches
articulate three insular goals for Title VII with respect to grooming,
and each approach emphasizes and balances the interests of
employees and employers differently. None of these existing
approaches are without flaws. When they are intermingled they
create a jurisprudence that is unclear and that results in courts
upholding employer policies regardless of how offensive they are to
employees or how necessary they are to employers. Grooming and
appearance jurisprudence becomes even more confusing when
scholars and courts fail to recognize the true context of the haircut
and sexual minority cases. Courts and scholars must adopt a new
approach, using the mistakes of the past as a blueprint for the future.
In doing so they may create a new legal framework that recognizes
the unique interests of employees and employers in grooming and
appearance, and that only allows sex-based grooming and appearance
requirements to impede equal employment opportunity to the extent
necessary for enterprises to succeed.

